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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Clean Air Standards on the
Reservation
In Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 976 (1982), the Ninth Circuit approved tribal regulation of
the air quality standards on the reservation, which presents a
potential for definite effects on lands outside the borders of Indian land.
The petitioner sought review of an order of the EPA that gave
approval.to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's redesignation of its
reservation from Class II to Class I air quality standards. The
court affirmed the EPA's approval of tribal recommended redesignation, noting that Indian tribes have been granted the specific
authority for redesignation of clean air standards concerning
their tribal lands;' and further, just as a tribe possesses the
authority to prevent the entrance of nonmembers onto the reservation, 2 a tribe may exercise control, in conjunction 'with the
EPA, over the entrance of pollutants onto the reservation. The
court indicated, in addition, that the exercise of such tribal
authority does not violate the provisions of the Constitution or
the Clean Air Act.
HUNTING AND FISHING: Regulatory Authority Over NonIndians on Tribal Land
On remand, after being vacated by the United States Supreme
Court' in the light of Montana v. United States,2 Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. New Mexico was again decided in favor of the
Mescalero Apache Tribe, which sought to enjoin the state of New
Mexico from enforcing its game laws against non-Indians who
hunt and fish within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation.
The Tenth Circuit found this case distinguishable from Montana
because the issue here was whether a state has authority to
regulate non-Indian hunting on Indian-ownedland within a reservation, not whether an Indian tribe has authority "to regu1. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c) (1975).
2. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980); Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
1. 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
2. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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late fishing and hunting by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians."3 Instead, the court
found Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe," decided after this case
was remanded from the Supreme Court, to be controlling. Following the holding in Merrion that a tribe has "general authority,
as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction,
and to defray the cost of providing governmental services," ' the
Mescalero court held that an Indian tribe's inherent sovereignty
in matters concerning self-government and internal relations
preclude any attempt by a state to regulate non-Indian hunting or
fishing conducted exclusively on reservation land held by the
tribe, particularly where the state has not participated in the
tribe's extensive management of the wildlife on those lands.
JURISDICTION: Tribal and Federal Authority to Regulate
Tribal Business
The power of a state to regulate liquor transactions involving
tribal members was curtailed in the Ninth Circuit's consolidated
decision involving three consolidated cases. The common issue in
all three cases was whether under the Act of August 18, 1953, 18
U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) (governing the application of Indian liquor
laws), the states or the Indian tribes have licensing and distribution jurisdiction over Indian country liquor transactions.
In Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1980), Rehner, an
Indian trader on the Pala Reservation in California, sought
review of the district court's decision requiring the obtainment of
a liquor license from the state of California before lawful sales of
liquor could take place on the reservation.
In two of the consolidated cases, the state of Washington seized
liquor enioute to the Indian reservations where each of the tribes
maintained retail liquor stores operated in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 1161 (1976).
The tribes sought injunctive relief in the district court, and
Washington counterclaimed seeking injunctive and monetary relief. The district court held that the tribes possessed exclusive
regulatory jurisdiction over liquor sales on the reservation and
denied the state's request for relief; Washington appealed.
On review, both Washington and California asserted that
3. Id. at 547.
4. 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982).
5. Id. at 901.
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through 18 U.S.C. § 1161, Congress delegated regulatory authority over tribal liquor transactions within the states. In a detailed
analysis of the statutory.language of section 1161, the Ninth Circuit concluded that neither Washington nor California have
regulatory jurisdiction to license or distribute liquor in Indian
country. This decision affected the Rehner case by reversing the
district court's requirement that the Indian trader obtain a state
permit to conduct lawful sales on tribal land.
In Rehner, supra, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
determinations that (1) the states have no regulatory jurisdiction
over reservation liquor transactions, and (2) Washington's counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant
of injunctive relief to the tribes, and both cases have been remanded to adjudicate whether, and under what circumstances,
Washington may impose a tax on tribal liquor sales to nontribal
members. The Ninth Circuit's decision is largely in accordance
with an earlier Tenth Circuit decision.'
Ashcroft v. United States Dep't of the Interior
Businesses conducted on non-Indian fee lands within the outside
boundaries of the Navajo Reservation are subject to the regulations enacted by the Secretary of the"Interior in accordance with
Indian trader statutes. So held the Ninth Circuit in Ashcroft v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 679 F.2d (9th Cir. 1982), a
case appealed from the U.S. District Court of Arizona.
In 1975 the Secretary of the Interior enacted regulations governing "Licensed Indian Traders" and "Business Practices on the
Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni Reservations."' Business owners and
operators on fee patent land located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation contended these regulations are inapplicable to their operations. The Arizona District Court agreed. In
reversing this decision, the Ninth Circuit determined that all
tribes retain elements of sovereignty over land within reservation
boundaries, absent exclusive jurisdiction of another tribe or that
of the federal government. A tribe retains sovereign power over
non-Indian fee land within the reservation, to the extent neces1. United States v. New Mexico, 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444

U.s. 832 (1979).
1. 25 C.F.R. §§ 251, 252.
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sary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.2
This inherent tribal sovereign power over non-Indian land
renders the BIA's determination that such lands are "on the
reservation" and subject to Indian trader statutes' regulations,
reasonable. Such an interpretation is also consistent with legislative intent, and in the avoidance of the problem of "checkerboard jurisdiction," discussed in relation to state taxation of fee
lands within a reservation. 3
TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS: Land Use
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
The United States, as trustee for the Crow Tribe of Montana,
sought by this action for declaratory relief to resolve a conflict
between the tribe and the state of Montana over the control of
hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the tribe on its reservation. The tribe claimed title to the bed of the Big Horn River
through the treaties that created the reservation, and exclusive
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on the river and in all
parts of the reservation including lands now owned by nonIndians in fee simple. Montana claimed all hunting and fishing by
non-Indians was subject to state, not tribal, regulation. The
Supreme Court held that unless a treaty contains explicit language
to the contrary, the United States holds lands under navigable rivers in trust for future states. ' The Crow treaties did not contain sufficient excepting language; therefore the riverbed passed to
Montana upon statehood. The Court also held that neither the
original treaty obligations nor the tribe's claim to "inherent sovereignty" could provide a foundation for extending the tribe's
authority beyond matters relating to tribal self-government or internal relations to the regulation of non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land. Such authority did, however,
clearly allow the tribe to prohibit or regulate nonmember hunting
and fishing on land owned by the tribe or held in trust for it by
the United States.
2 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
3. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478 (1975), citing
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
1. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23, 229 (1845).
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Cardin v. De La Cruz
In Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982), the
Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court decision and held that the
Quinault Tribe has the power to enforce its building, health, and
safety regulations against a non-Indian owner of land and a
grocery store business located within the boundaries of the
Quinault Reservation.
Appellee in this case was a non-Indian who owned land in fee
within the boundaries of the Quinault Reservation on which he
operated a grocery store. When appellee bought the land and
store he consulted with tribal officials about measures the tribe
wanted taken to comply with tribal building, health, and safety
regulations. However, he reopened the store without taking those
measures. The tribe obtained an injunction in the tribal court
directing appellee to close the store until he complied with the
Tribal Code. Appellee filed suit in federal district court seeking to
enjoin tribal officers from regulating the operations of his
business. The district court held that the tribe lacked jurisdiction
to enforce its regulations against a non-Indian on land he owned
in fee.
Relying upon Montana, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court. The circuit court found that the tribe's exercise of civil
jurisdiction over appellee's business belonged to both of the
broad categories in which, according to Montana, Indian tribes
retain their sovereign powers. The tribe was regulating the activities of a non-Indian who had entered consensual relationships
with the tribe through commercial dealing, and the conduct that
the tribe was regulating threatened or had direct effect on the
health or welfare of the tribe.
Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes
In Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900
(10th Cir. 1982), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian tribes have the authority to zone
non-Indian owned, fee-patented lands located within the exterior
boundaries of the Wind River Reservation.
The Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian tribes brought suit to enjoin development of two subdivisions on fee lands located within
the reservation because the developers had not complied with the
tribal zoning ordinance. The district court ordered a partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction requiring compliance with the zoning ordinance, and the developers appealed.
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The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the developers' contention
that the tribes have no authority to control the use of fee lands by
non-Indians without a delegation by Congress of such power.
The power to control use of non-Indian-owned land located
within the reservation flows from the inherent sovereign rights of
self-government and territorial management. The circuit court
also found that denial of the right to control use of non-Indianowned land located within the reservation does not arise by implication as a necessary result of the tribes' dependent status.
The circuit court further held that the absence of any land-use
control over lands within the reservation and the interest of the
tribes in preserving and protecting their homeland from exploitation justifies the zoning code. The fact that the code applies to
and affects non-Indians who cannot participate in tribal government is immaterial. The tribal zoning ordinance related substantially to the general welfare of those living on the reservation and
thus was valid.
TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNMENT:
Negotiate Leases and Contracts

Tribal Authority To

In Inecon Agricorporation v. Tribal Farms, Inc.,' members of
the Fort Mojave Tribe organized Tribal Farms, Inc., an Arizona
corporation, for the purpose of borrowing investment funds from
lenders who would not provide financing unless the borrower was
subject to both federal and state court jurisdiction. Agricorporation brought action, seeking to enforce the contractual arbitration award entered against the tribal corporation. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Arizona farming corporation formed by the Mojave Tribe did
not fall within the protected class of "tribe of Indians or individual Indians" provided for in 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 81, 84. Thie portion
of the Code establishes the requirement that Indian contracts be
approved by government officials. The court's interpretation of
these sections will permit tribal corporations to enter into contractual obligations without secretarial approval.
In Yavapai-Prescott Tribe v. Watts,' the United States District
Court for the District bf Arizona reversed a decision of the Inter1. 656 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1981).
1. 528 F. Supp. 695 (D.C. Airz. 1981).
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ior Board of Indian Appeals, and ruled that a tribe may cancel a
business lease of Indian trust land without the prior approval of
the Secretary of the Interior. While 25 U.S.C. § 415 provides that
Indian owners may negotiate leases subject only to the terms required by the Secretary, and with his approval of the lease, this
Arizona decision permits tribal lease cancellation without
secretarial approval, providing that the lease in question contains
no terms expressly requiringsecretarial approval. If the lease contained such an express provision, the provision would likely control and Secretary approval would be required before cancellation.
WATER RIGHTS:

Ownership of Beds of Navigable Waters

The Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation (hereafter "the tribes") sought to regulate the exercise of
federal common law riparian rights by certain non-Indians who
owned land bordering the half of Flathead Lake within the reservation. That action was consolidated with separate suits filed by
the city of Polson, Montana, the state of Montana, and the
United States as trustee for the tribes, seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether the Flathead Reservation had been terminated
by the 1904 Flathead Act. The circuit court held that: (1) the
Flathead Reservation had not been terminated by a congressional
act opening to non-Indian settlement reservation lands remaining
after allotments to the Indians because a congressional intent to
terminate was not clearly indicated by the face of the act, its legislative history, or by the surrounding circumstances; (2) under a
stated exception to the general rule of Montana v. United States,1
the treaty creating the reservation did convey beneficial ownership of the southern half of Flathead Lake to the tribes in express
terms; and (3) also within exceptions granted by the Court in
Montana, the tribes had authority to regulate the exercise by nonIndians of common law riparian rights which entailed the use of
tribal trust land (i.e., the part of the lake owned by the tribes), or
which had the potential for affecting the economy, welfare, and
health of the tribes.

1. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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